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WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ‘HUMAN NATURE’ AND ‘HUMAN DIGNITY’ IN 
OUR BIOTECHNOLOGICAL AGE? 
 
Roberto Andorno* 
 
Introduction 
 
Rapid developments in genetics and reproductive technologies, including the 
prospect of human genetic engineering, cloning and various forms of 
enhancing human capacities, oblige us to face very old questions that have 
been largely abandoned in modern philosophy. What does it mean to be 
human? What constitutes a meaningful life? Do human beings have intrinsic 
worthiness? What values should guide society in making its choices?  
 
In this paper, I first argue that these fundamental questions are today more 
valid than ever, and that they need to be specifically addressed in the 
context of human biotechnological interventions and not lumped together 
with other technological developments. Second, I briefly explore the 
question of whether the notions of human nature and human dignity can 
contribute to the efforts that are aimed at responding to the new dilemmas 
posed by technological interventions on ourselves and on our descendants.  
 
I. The Dilemmas Posed by Human Biotechnologies Need to Be 
Specifically Addressed 
 
At present, there is a renewed interest in the classic philosophical questions 
about the ends and the features that properly characterise human living 
conditions. While such questions are never irrelevant, they have rarely been 
more important than they are today. We are now beginning to deal with 
technologies that are unique in that the object upon which they operate is 
not something external to us, but rather apply to ourselves. In addition, the 
changes that some of them may introduce on humans are irreversible, that 
is, they cannot be removed and are passed on to future generations. 
 
It is true that all technological innovations have always had a certain impact 
on the way we live, in the sense that they have influenced our behaviour 
and have created new needs (just consider the substantial impact that the 
Internet and mobile phones have on our daily lives). It is also true that 
every new technological development can be used for good and bad 
purposes; nuclear energy can be used both to generate electricity and to 
produce the atomic bomb. This might suggest that there is nothing special 
with human genetic engineering and with the (not too far) possibility of 
predetermining the features of future children. 
However, the fact remains that there is a significant difference between both 
types of technologies. In the case of those operating upon external things, 
we have always had the choice to continue using them or not; we can freely 
accept them if they are beneficial, or flat out renounce them when we find 
out that they are more harmful than helpful. For instance, in order to 
preserve the environment we can decide (as we are gradually doing) to 
abandon oil and develop renewable forms of energy (i.e. solar energy). Put 
bluntly, we are free to make such choices.  
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On the contrary, as mentioned above, human biotechnologies operate not 
upon the things that we use, but upon the users themselves (i.e. upon 
ourselves) as they directly aim to predetermine human features. But once 
those changes have been introduced into the genetically engineered 
individuals, there is no way back; they are irreversible, not only because 
they cannot be removed from the individuals themselves, but also because 
they will be presumably passed on to their children. This is why it can be 
said that they reduce the capacity for choice itself. This radically different 
situation places the dilemmas emerging from human biotechnologies in a 
special, separate category. 
 
To illustrate this point, consider the following examples. Imagine a cloned 
teenager who is psychologically suffering as a direct result of having been 
produced as a genetic copy of another human being (for instance, his 
grandfather, a movie star, a famous tennis player, etc.). This individual will 
be deprived of his capacity of choice, since he cannot cease being the 
genetic copy that he is. The same could be said of a genetically engineered 
person who is disgusted by the enhanced abilities with which he was 
deliberately endowed before birth (for instance, enhanced memory), and 
remains nevertheless condemned to continue living with them. Even if he 
would like to be able to forget certain memories, he will continue 
remembering everything. We see here  a dramatic paradox, that the 
enhanced freedom of choice of the potential parents to predetermine the 
features of their children results in the reduced freedoms of the latter. 
 
That being said, it is true that people have used different technical means to 
enhance their abilities for centuries (for instance, wearing glasses or using 
binoculars to see objects at long distances). And it may follow that there is 
nothing radically new about altering our bodies or our brains for 
enhancement purposes. However, putting aside the distinction that many of 
the potential technological alterations operate upon future people, and not 
upon the manipulators themselves, it should be noted that we are not 
necessarily confronted with changes that represent a mere difference in 
degree, but a real difference in kind. There is indeed a tremendous 
difference between wearing glasses and, let us say, redesigning humans to 
give them an extra eye in the back of the head. 
 
The main source of trouble for many people is the possible impact of some 
biotechnological interventions upon not only ourselves, but on those who will 
succeed us, that is, on humankind as a whole, and on the identity of the 
human species. Many people fear that we are moving towards an 
increasingly dehumanised society. It is not by chance that almost all science 
fiction films, which tend to reflect people‟s fears and concerns, present a 
very dark picture of the future technological interventions on our minds and 
bodies.1  
 
II. Does ‘Human Nature’ Play a Role in the New Search for 
Normative Criteria? 
 
In this context of potentially dehumanising technologies, the hope is that the 
recourse to notions like „nature‟, „human nature‟ or „human dignity‟ may help 
                                               
1 Several films illustrate this point: Blade Runner (1982); Matrix (1999); The 6th Day (2000); 
Artificial Intelligence (2001); Minority Report (2002); I, Robot (2004); Surrogates (2009). But 
Gattaca (1997) is without doubt some  of the best examples. It is scientifically accurate and 
particularly interesting from a legal perspective: it presents a society where genetic information 
plays the primary role in determining social class, and where prospective parents suffer subtle 
but strong pressure to genetically engineer their children. 
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us in the search for adequate responses to the tremendous challenges that 
we are beginning to face. The expectation is that these basic concepts can 
offer some normative criteria, that is, that they can guide our policy options 
so as to preserve some key features of our common humanity. This is at 
least the hope. What is clear is that these new circumstances raise 
extremely challenging questions which we are probably not prepared to 
respond. Which technologies can contribute to the flourishing of humankind 
and genuinely improve human living conditions? Which ones cannot? Which 
biotechnological developments should be encouraged, and which should be 
avoided? Is our humanity something that we can shape like clay? Are there 
some limits, and if so, what are these limits? Are all technological alterations 
of the human condition desirable? In other words, do they pay off? Who will 
be the ultimate arbitrator when selecting the „best‟ features and abilities in 
future generations? 
 
These are extremely difficult questions to which there are no clear-cut 
answers. Technological advances in different areas make indeed great 
contributions to our well-being in the fields of health, communication, 
working conditions, etc. The question is whether, at a certain point, 
technological interventions on our bodies and minds could be 
counterproductive and degrade our sense of self, in addition to reducing our 
status of subjects to that of objects designed by others.  
 
Of course, it would be absurd to consider that all new biotechnological 
innovations are intrinsically wrong. But it would be naive to see them as 
inherently good. Since the dropping of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima we 
know that technological developments can also have catastrophic 
consequences. The serious environmental problems that we are now 
confronting as a consequence of over-industrialisation are another example 
of this. The question remains whether the notion of „nature‟ (or „natural‟) can 
assist us in providing a response to the challenges posed by the increasing 
number of technological interventions upon ourselves.  
 
It should be acknowledged that the concept of nature is very tricky to 
unravel when determining its meaning. It can be used as a descriptive 
notion to provide a collection of distinctive features that characterise some 
entities which are distinguishable from others. When the notion of nature (or 
natural) is used with this meaning, it seems that no moral conclusions can 
be drawn from it. Trying to deduce values from mere facts would represent 
the so-called „naturalistic fallacy‟, which has been denounced by Hume, G.E. 
Moore and other philosophers.  
 
But besides describing nature as a static or descriptive notion, it can also be 
understood to be a dynamic one. This is the classic or Aristotelian 
understanding of nature, which makes reference to the internal principle of 
action of something (especially living beings). From this perspective, when 
an entity operates according to its nature it can be said that the action is 
„natural‟ (or good), because it realises the potentialities of that being. A dog 
that wags its tail when pleased acts according to its nature, while a dog that 
climbs a tree to hunt pigeons does not. In the case of humans, who are 
characterised by reason and free will, „natural‟ is synonymous for 
„reasonable‟. We act according to nature when we use our reason to pursue 
our intrinsic goods. Thus, the idea is that we are able to recognise by reason 
some (basic) goods for us and for the society in which we live, and then 
distinguish right and wrong actions depending on whether they are in 
conformity with those basic goods, or not. It is not difficult to see that the 
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notion of „nature‟ (or „natural‟) does not serve  merely descriptive role, but 
rather a normative one.  
 
An example might help to illustrate this point. If we say, from this 
perspective, that „it is natural that parents take care of their small children‟, 
we are not saying that this is merely a biological fact, nor are we saying that 
99% of parents take care of their children, and therefore, that this is a good 
thing to do (this argument would be a naturalistic fallacy). We intend to say 
that it is good that parents take care of their children because parenthood 
presupposes such care, i.e. that such care is a constitutive element of 
parenthood.  
 
III. Human Dignity as the Intrinsic Value of Human Beings 
 
Like human nature, the notion of human dignity is also very difficult to 
define and confronts us with several paradoxes. One paradox is that dignity 
is easier to grasp when we consider what is contrary to it rather than what is 
in conformity with it. It is when we face the worst things that can be done to 
a human being (torture, slavery, degrading treatments or punishments, etc.) 
that we better understand, by contrast, what „dignity‟ means. These 
situations of extreme degradation or humiliation help us to become aware 
that respect for human dignity is a very real requirement of human 
interaction and not simply a metaphysical hypothesis. Perhaps this 
experiential approach is unable to offer any academic definition, but 
provides us with a vivid experience of what it means to have dignity which is 
disregarded via dehumanising treatment. 
 
This phenomenon explains why the notion of human dignity is usually 
characterised in negative terms, for instance, by saying that it embodies the 
idea that “there are some things that should not be done to anybody 
anywhere”,2 or that people must “never be treated in a way that denies the 
distinct importance of their own lives”.3 Even the Kantian categorical 
imperative, according to which no one is to be treated as a mere means to 
another‟s end, can be regarded as example of this via negativa. 
 
Although the notion of human dignity has a very long history in philosophy, 
it has re-emerged with great vigour after the Second World War as an 
international legal and political concept which aims to stress the need for 
unconditional respect of every human being in the different realms of social 
life. It was in response to the horrors of this tragic period in history that the 
Member States of the newly created United Nations reaffirmed their “faith 
(…) in the dignity and worth of the human person”.4 Subsequently, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) served as the cornerstone of 
the new international human rights system which was grounded on the 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family”.5 The Declaration puts forward that “all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”6 and that, for 
                                               
2 M. Midgley, „Towards an Ethic of Global Responsibility‟, in: Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler 
(eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, p. 160. 
3 R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion. An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual 
Freedom, New York, Vintage 1994, p. 236. 
4 Charter of the United Nations (1945), Preamble, at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml  (21 December 2010). 
5 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Preamble, at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (21December 2010).  
6 Idem, Article 1. 
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this reason “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”.7  
 
It is true that the notion of human dignity, which is at the heart of  major 
international human rights instruments, is never explicitly defined by them. 
However, they provide a valuable guidance for the understanding of this 
concept when they state: first, that dignity is “inherent … in all members of 
the human family”8; second, that all human beings are “free and equal in 
dignity and rights”9; and third, that “these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person”.10 
 
These three ideas, even though they may appear to be extremely vague, are 
very helpful to better understand the meaning and role of human dignity: 
 
1. The use of the term „inherent‟ (or „intrinsic‟) aims to emphasise that 
dignity is inseparable from the human condition. Dignity is not an accidental 
quality of some human beings, or a value derived from some specific 
physical or mental abilities, nor is it derived from the fact of belonging to 
some socio-economic, ethnic or religious group, but rather an unconditional 
worth that everyone posseses by virtue of being human.  
 
2. If dignity is inherent to every human being, it applies equally to all. It 
would follow that there cannot be different levels of dignity. If, in addition, 
dignity is the source of all basic rights and freedoms, then the latter should 
also be the same for every single one of us (universality of human rights). 
 
3. If human dignity is the foundation of human rights, then rights are pre-
existing (i.e. moral) claims, and not just the product of a benevolent 
decision by the state. Therefore, the state is obliged to recognise and 
promote respect for human rights.  
 
IV. The Central Role of Human Dignity in Bioethics 
 
There is a close relationship between the central role played by human 
dignity in international law on the one hand and medical ethics/bioethics on 
the other. This is not by chance. Both domains emerged simultaneously from 
the same tragic event, the Second World War, and for this reason are 
conceptually much closer than usually assumed.  
 
The emphasis on human dignity that dominates the ethical and political 
discourse since 1945 can, to a large extent, be explained by the horrors 
witnessed in the revelations that prisoners of concentration camps, including 
children, were used by Nazi physicians as subjects of brutal experiments. In 
this regard, the American bioethicist Robert Baker asserts that the UDHR 
was in part informed by the discoveries of these abuses, which led in 1947 
to the development of the Nuremberg Code by the trial that condemned the 
Nazi physicians. Baker claims that “the details revealed daily at Nuremberg 
gave content to the rights recognized by Articles 4 through 20 of the 
Declaration”.11 Similarly, George J. Annas has pointed out that “World War II 
                                               
7 Idem, Article 5.  
8 Idem, Preamble. 
9 Idem, Article 1. 
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (21 December 2010); and International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (21 December 2010). 
11 R. Baker, „Bioethics and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective‟, Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics, 2001, vol. 10, issue 3, p. 241-252. 
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was the crucible in which both human rights and bioethics were forged, and 
they have been related by blood ever since.”12 It was the need to put some 
limits to the research involving human subjects that led to the renewed 
importance of the idea of human dignity after the end of the Second World 
War. 
 
Thereafter, since the end of the 1970s, the recourse to human dignity in 
relation to medicine went beyond the field of medical research and began to 
be applied in the debate on a vast array of diverging practices, especially 
those that operate at the edges of life, like in vitro fertilisation, 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, futile therapies on dying patients, 
assisted suicide and euthanasia. In this varied context, it is not surprising 
that the term dignity was sometimes used to support different and even 
opposed views. Simultaneously, the concept also began to be employed to 
criticise what was regarded as the new forms of commodification of the 
human body, which includes organ selling and surrogate motherhood.  
 
This broad and multifaceted function of human dignity is visible in the 
instruments adopted during the last decade by intergovernmental bodies, 
such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe. Those instruments confer on the 
notion of human dignity the status of an overarching principle, that is, of an 
ultimate and general standard that is called to provide an ultimate 
foundation to the norms governing the whole biomedical field, in particular 
those relating to the requirements of informed consent, the ban on genetic 
discrimination, the confidentiality of personal health information, the 
protection of organ donors, among others.13  
 
But an important shift took place by the end of the 1990s, when a different 
and much broader meaning of the notion of dignity was incorporated, in 
order to stress the need to preserve the identity and integrity of the human 
species against some biotechnological developments, such as germline 
interventions and reproductive cloning. The notion of human dignity was 
now seen as the last barrier against the alteration of some basic features of 
humankind (for instance, biparentality in the case of cloning, and the non-
predetermination of people‟s features by third persons with regard to 
germline interventions).  
 
In this context, what seems to be at stake is not the dignity of the currently 
existing individuals, but the value we attach to the existence and integrity of 
humankind as such. A major part of the current controversies surrounding 
the use (or for some abuse) of human dignity relates to this extended 
understanding of the concept. This is not surprising given that this is a much 
more abstract notion than the traditional idea of dignity and that the limits 
between what deserves protection from improper manipulation and what 
does not, are quite blurred.  
 
In the case of cloning and germline interventions, a number of serious 
arguments have been advanced to show that these procedures really 
jeopardise our understanding of what it means to be human. Regarding 
reproductive cloning (leaving aside all of the social and psychological 
implications of the techniques), sexual reproduction is at stake, that is, the 
fact that every individual is conceived by the fusion of two gametes provided 
by two different persons, a male („father‟) and a female („mother‟). 
                                               
12 G. J. Annas, American Bioethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 159-161. 
13 R. Andorno, „Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics‟, 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009-3, pp. 223-240. Available online at: 
http://www.unesco.org.uy/shs/red-bioetica/uploads/media/dignidad_Andorno.pdf 
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Biparentality, which is regarded by biologists as a hallmark of evolution, is a 
key feature of advanced animals, while asexual reproduction can only be 
found in unicellular organisms, as well as in some insects and fishes. It is 
indeed difficult to believe that promoting asexual reproduction in humans 
would constitute progress for the human species. Instead, it would represent 
a tremendous regression, which would probably be the most dramatic one 
that humankind has ever experienced. 
 
Regarding germline interventions, what seems to be at risk is freedom from 
deliberate genetic predetermination by third persons, and, in the long run, 
the principle of equality between generations. Paradoxically, this freedom 
closely depends upon the circumstance of the features of each individual 
that are left to chance, rather than to choice. According to some 
philosophers, chance in human reproduction can be regarded as a value in 
itself, which needs to be protected against a potential misuse of new 
technologies.14  
 
It is important to note that the human rights framework is powerless to face 
the challenges posed by these procedures because rights only belong to 
existing individuals, not to humanity as such or to future generations. The 
claim made that individuals have the „right not to be conceived as a genetic 
copy of another person‟, or a „right to inherit non-manipulated genetic 
information‟ serves more as rhetorical statements, than conceptually 
consistent arguments. How could people who have not yet been conceived 
be entitled to any rights? Clearly, there is an urgent need to develop new 
conceptual and legal tools to address these new issues.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Classic philosophical questions that have largely been neglected in modern 
times are re-emerging nowadays as a consequence of the possible 
implications of biotechnological interventions on our bodies and minds. The 
new potential developments raise also completely new questions that include 
the moral role that chance in human reproduction might play in ensuring the 
freedom of future generations, and the need to preserve the constitutive 
features of our own species (such as biparentality). What is clear is that 
great wisdom is required when addressing these challenges. Today, more 
than ever, we are impelled to make serious intellectual efforts to distinguish 
between those technological developments that may contribute to the well-
being of mankind, from those that may reveal in the long run to be more 
harmful than helpful.  
 
 
-The Amsterdam Law Forum is an open access initiative supported by the VU University Library- 
 
                                               
14 See J. Habermas, Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur: Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen 
Eugenik?, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2001. 
